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Changing the Conversation in Education Law:
Political Geography and Virtual Schooling
Aaron J. Saiger*
JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART. Oxford University
Press (2010).
PAUL E. PETERSON, SAVING SCHOOLS: FROM HORACE MANN TO VIRTUAL
LEARNING. Harvard University Press (2010).
ABSTRACT
In Five Miles Away, A World Apart, James E. Ryan con-
cludes that the educational reforms of the hour, school account-
ability and school choice, will exacerbate rather than undermine
the systematic educational advantages enjoyed by wealthier
Americans. Paul Peterson, in his Saving Schools, argues that
increasingly centralizing American schools have become suffi-
ciently centralized that, as a labor-intensive industry, few pro-
ductivity gains are available from governance reform, even as
demand escalates for the customization of education to individ-
ual needs.
Both volumes therefore pin their hopes for change upon
political geography-the relationship between people and edu-
cational institutions in space. Ryan argues that changing demo-
graphic trends with respect to wealth and race create a window
for interest convergence between whites and minorities and
between rich and poor. Peterson concludes his volume with a
fascinating chapter on virtual education, which untethers educa-
tion from institutions like school districts that are based upon
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physical location. I suggest that virtual schooling also offers
important, and unsettling, possibilities when analyzed in Ryan's
interest-convergence framework. This is true particularly
because of the likely impact online education will have upon the
religious-school sector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent books-Five Miles Away, A World Apart, by James E.
Ryan, and Saving Schools, by Paul Peterson-call for "chang[ing] the
conversation" about American education.' This shared imperative is
instructive given that the two volumes diverge in agenda, intellectual
frame, and strategy of inquiry. Ryan focuses upon the perennial
inequities of American education, where, still in 2012, prosperous white
children and less privileged black students living nearly as neighbors
inhabit wildly disparate educational worlds. Peterson, although also dis-
tressed by inequity, focuses primarily upon low and inconsistent overall
educational quality. Five Miles Away begins with Brown v. Board, and
stresses institutions. Saving Schools begins earlier, with Horace Mann,
and gives most of its attention to personalities and ideas. Ryan writes as
the leading K-12 education law expert in the United States; Peterson is
one the most distinguished political scientists writing in the field.
The two accounts nevertheless overlap substantially. Both devote
considerable attention to issues of education law and of implementation:
to the failure, after Brown, to integrate American schools; to school
finance cases in state court and their ambiguous impact on equality and
equity; to accountability regimes like No Child Left Behind;3 and to
school choice. Both detect structural similarities among all these
reforms that lead them to doubt that any will fundamentally improve
American education or change its educational conversation. Those
doubts are rooted in analytic arguments which considerably advance our
understanding of education law. As I discuss in Part II of this Essay,
Ryan develops the important argument that school accountability and
school choice reforms are structured to preserve, not mitigate, the edu-
1. JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 297 (2010); PAUL E. PETERSON,
SAVING ScHoOLs: FROM HoRAcE MANN TO VIRTUAL LEARNING 209 (2010).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578.
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cational advantages of wealthier groups. Part III analyzes Peterson's
conclusion that the long centralization trend in American education has
reached the point where, in a labor-intensive industry, few productivity
gains are available from governance reform, even as demand intensifies
for the customization of education to individual needs.
Neither author, however, concludes that American education is
intractable. Indeed, both take the opposite position. And, strikingly,
both argue that when America's educational conversation does change,
those changes will be rooted in political geography, that is, in changes to
the relationships between people and educational institutions in space.
Ryan pins his hopes on "demographic trends [that] are changing the
composition of metropolitan areas and creating opportunities for inte-
gration-both socioeconomic and racial-that have not existed in the
past."' Peterson concludes his volume with a fascinating chapter on vir-
tual education, which introduces a relationship between schooling and
space that is brand new.'
In Part IV of this Essay, I suggest that their shared emphasis upon
political geography makes it worthwhile to place these two important
volumes in conversation. In particular, virtual education untethers edu-
cation from institutions like school districts that are based upon physical
location, undermining the relationship between geography and school-
ing at its foundations. Cyberschools rearrange the problem of educa-
tional inequity, especially as such schools are combined with the char-
ter-school form. They will enable extensive access across jurisdictional
lines while at the same time exacerbating inequities already associated
with charter quality and differential access to technology. Less obvious,
but potentially more importantly, virtual education could reintroduce
religious stratification into American education as the religious-school
sector recognizes the technology's potential.
Religion is an instructive case, however, because religious virtual edu-
cation also offers a new field for Ryan's argument that we should take
advantage of changing patterns of geographic stratification to find
opportunities for integration and interest convergence. Virtual religious
charters offer a constitutional way to include those committed to reli-
gious education among those who benefit from robust state support for
all public education.
4. RYAN, supra note 1, at 281.
5. PErERSON, supra note 1, at 229-63.
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At this writing, it is unclear whether virtual schooling will be boon or
bane for educational quality and equality in America, and how. What is
already certain is that it will be prominent among substantial, and loom-
ing, changes in America's educational conversation.
II. NIXON'S COMPROMISE AND PRAGMATIC REFORM
Five Miles Away provides thick historical and analytic accounts of
Brown v. Board, Brown's aftermath, school finance reform, school
choice, and the standards and testing movement that are refreshingly
insightful, empirical, and fair. These are leavened with the results of
interviews Ryan conducted with students in two close-by Virginia school
systems, one fairly affluent and high-achieving and the other substan-
tially, though not overwhelmingly, distressed.
The book's chronological frame should not obscure its central analyt-
ic argument. Ryan, over several years, has developed the claim that,
since Brown, movement towards genuine equality of educational oppor-
tunity has been thwarted by the overwhelming political power of (large-
ly white) suburbanites, whose families benefit from inequality and
deploy their existing advantage to protect it.6 Five Miles Away dubs this
phenomenon "Nixon's compromise."7  The moniker stems from the
Supreme Court's famous 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley, widely
known as "Milliken I."8 The Milliken I plaintiffs, students in urban
Detroit, argued that any effective remedy for prior de jure school segre-
gation in Detroit would require the participation of the school districts of
the Detroit suburbs, because the Detroit school district proper had
become overwhelmingly African American.' (It remains so to this day.)
The Court rejected this position and held that no suburban school dis-
trict could be included in a desegregation remedy unless it could be
shown that that particular district had also itself engaged in dejure racial
discrimination. 1
6. See James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635,
1645-47 (2004); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 11
YALE L.J. 2043, 2087-91 (2002); James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance
Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529,566-67 (1999).
7. RYAN, supra note 1, at 94.
8.418 U.S. 717.
9. Id. at 739.
10. Id. at 745.
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Milliken I is widely understood as a watershed in the history of school
discrimination. Ryan rightly calls it "easily the most important desegre-
gation decision aside from Brown."" By making the boundaries
between school districts impervious to court-ordered desegregation, the
Court protected, enabled, and encouraged white flight to suburban dis-
tricts. 2
Ryan observes that this result was as popular among white liberals and
moderates as among conservatives.'3 Urban blacks, meanwhile, were
themselves less than enthusiastic about racial mixing and the busing of
schoolchildren.'4 This near-consensus was shrewdly championed by
President Nixon, who proposed in 1972 to outlaw busing for the purpose
of achieving racial balance. 5 At the same time, Nixon offered to provide
greater resources to students in poor schools. "The compromise Nixon
offered was quite explicit: students in the city would remain in the city
and not be permitted to attend suburban schools; in exchange for staying
put, they would get more resources."' 6
The Supreme Court adopted Nixon's approach when the Milliken I
plaintiffs returned to the Court following their loss to ask that the State
of Michigan be required to provide additional resources to Detroit
schools. 7 The Court acceded to their request.'8 The financial remedies
of Milliken II, although they imposed duties upon the state treasury, were
palatable because they would not directly affect the suburbs. 9
Ryan's claim is that Nixon's compromise has not only been endorsed
by the Supreme Court in one particular case but has emerged as a legal
and political trope. It has "shape[d] nearly every modem education
reform," whether advanced through "court decision or legislation,"2 and
is ubiquitous at both the state and federal levels. Nixon's compromise
systematically prevails irrespective of the novelty or strength of partic-
ular legal or theoretical arguments that might be raised against it. Thus,
as Ryan describes in an extraordinarily thorough, detailed, and fair chap-
11. RYAN, supra note 1, at 105.
12. Id. at 272. See also Aaron Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. L.
495,505-06 (2010).
13. RYAN, supra note 1, at 96.
14. Id. at 97.
15. Id. at 95.
16. Id.
17. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken l), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
18 Id.
19. RYAN, supra note 1, at 104-05.
20. Id. at 5.
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ter, the school finance cases-claims in state court that poor schools
have a right to additional funding under the education clauses of state
constitutions-ultimately "followed a similar trajectory" to the desegre-
gation cases, even though the two kinds of cases are based upon entire-
ly disparate legal theories.2' The same trajectory persisted as the finance
cases adjusted their own legal theories from federal constitutional claims
to state ones, and from claims emphasizing equity to those that alleged
merely that state constitutions require all schools to be adequate.
Ryan depicts Nixon's compromise as something short of an iron law.
Milliken, he writes, "could have come out differently."22 By this, Ryan
means not to make the uncontroversial claim that Milliken is wrong as a
matter of law, ' but that urban schools could have been transformed in
the ways that the Milliken plaintiffs had hoped. Notwithstanding "the
sense of inevitability that pervades thinking about this issue today,"24
there are "some intriguing counterexamples" of desegregated communi-
ties that defy the conventional wisdom. But, even if Nixon's compro-
mise is a contingent "accident of history," 6 that accident has loomed
large. Five Miles Away argues that, with but a few exceptions, the inter-
ests of the wealthy and their suburban districts consistently prevail in the
face of equity claims by have-nots. 7
The particular contribution of Five Miles Away is its sustained argu-
ment that the school reforms of the hour are no different, and will also
play out within the structural constraints of Nixon's compromise. Ryan
offers an excellent, nuanced treatment of "accountability" regimes like
the No Child Left Behind Act, which impose upon public schools
regimes of testing, measurement, the dissemination of information,
rewards, and sanctions. After a thorough and skeptical review of the
arguments and evidence for the claim that such regimes can improve the
performance of weak schools, Ryan ultimately concludes that even if
such regimes could bring failing schools up to a standard of adequacy-
a big if-doing so:
21. Id. at 178.
22. Id. at 110.
23. See Saiger, School District Boundary Problem, supra note 12, at 509-12.
24. RYAN, supra note 1, at I 11.
25. Id. at 112, 294-95.
26. Id. at 114.
27. Id. at 295.
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still leaves a large gap between the kind of education offered at a
typical suburban school and the kind offered at a typical urban
school. Proficiency does not guarantee equal opportunity; it prom-
ises the basics. President Nixon, in the early 1970s, proposed to the
compromise of keeping urban and suburban schools separate but
working to make them equal. We have compromised his compro-
mise. 8
Ryan makes a parallel argument about school choice. By choice, he
means both the voucher programs prominent in the late 1990s and early
aughts, and the charter school movement now experiencing explosive
growth and widespread acceptance that voucher advocates had sought
but never achieved. Ryan is right to identify these movements as species
of the same genus. Vouchers, as the name implies, are state-issued sub-
sidies to parents that can be redeemed by a participating school of the
parents' choosing, usually including private schools. Charters, a pub-
lic/private hybrid, face more stringent regulation than private schools
participating in voucher programs, and generally exclude religious
schools.29 Both programs share a key feature: they receive a per capita
state subsidy, but only when a family elects to enroll its child in that
school. Choice schools cannot survive unless parents choose them,
which, the argument runs, introduces market discipline into an industry
that is otherwise a government monopoly."
As with accountability, Ryan offers a thorough and fair-minded
review of the research evidence on the impact of choice upon academic
achievement and concludes that the benefits of choice are slight. He
acknowledges that some charters have posted strong academic results
but notes, correctly, that this could be due to any number of factors aside
from academic quality and that replication has been elusive. Taking up
a theme he identified several years ago, Ryan also identifies the "radical
potential" of choice31 to integrate schools racially and socioeconomical-
ly, by severing the relationship between place of residence and school
attendance. 2 For these reasons, he endorses interdistrict choice33 and
28. Id. at 260.
29. See James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 393,
394-95 (2008).
30. See R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY,
EQUALITY, AND DivERSITY 6-7 (2002).
31. RYAN, supra note 1, at 10.
32. Id. at 217.
33. Id. at 287.
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choice programs that specifically seek to create integrated schools.34 But
Ryan is bearish about the chance of these things happening. Interdistrict
choice offends suburban autonomy, and therefore, rarely occurs and is
hedged with restrictions where it is allowed 5 Many programs "seem
more like gestures towards choice, designed as much to protect local dis-
trict autonomy as to offer parents more options."" Charters in particu-
lar are an example of this, proliferating in the cities but rare in the sub-
urbs. 7 They are "Nixon's compromise all over again."38
Given this political reality, Five Miles Away advocates the adoption of
"[u]niversal choice" within "[c]ities and poor suburbs." Such choice
would be within-district, but would include public, charter, and private
schools and be offered to "all students," rather than, as is usual, being
restricted only to "disadvantaged, urban students, and even then
serv[ing] a tiny fraction of eligible students."" In particular, it should
include parents now paying private school tuitions and allow them to
benefit from a state subsidy. The book advocates this precisely because
of its potential to build a coalition that embraces both poor and middle-
class parentsY°  Only "by changing the political dynamics of urban
school systems by attracting more middle-income families into that sys-
tem" can integration be achieved.4 ' Even here, Ryan is far from opti-
mistic; indeed, he has become less sanguine about the ability of school
choice to enhance equality over time.42 His is a "radical" proposal," in
many places a "non-starter politically."' But it has potential: it is "not
exactly the same as tilting at windmills. 45
This move is quintessential James Ryan. Ryan has long staked out a
position that simultaneously insists upon hard-headed pragmatism and
rejects despair. This has been a welcome corrective to writing about
34. Id. at 290.
35. Id. at 192-98, 287.
36. Id. at 194.
37. Id. at 201.
38. Id. at 210.
39. Id. at 287.
40. Id. at 289.
41. Id. at 291.
42. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 6, at 2085 (noting the "radical potential" of choice); James
E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE LJ. 249, 314 (1999) ("urgling] those interested in
improving the educational opportunities for disadvantaged students" to consider choice pro-
grams).
43. RYAN, supra note 1, at 291.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 287.
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educational inequality, in both the legal academy and in education schol-
arship, which too often mates soft-headedness with an inveterate pes-
simism. Schools are vastly unequal in the United States, the latter genre
runs, because Americans have no genuine commitment either to equali-
ty or to education. Discount American rhetoric; American reality is
about power, and those with power are racist, supportive of the class dif-
ferences that serve them so well, and uncommitted to education. What
ought to be, of course, is for us and our institutions to abandon racism,
reject classism, and embrace the liberating potential of education for all
children. But of course that's not going to happen; therefore, we are
doomed to live with the schools that our actions, rather than our words,
say that we want. Some writers then take the additional step of sug-
gesting that because integration cannot happen, we should abandon it as
a goal and seek to improve our segregated schools.'
Ryan takes on this mindset with subtlety and vigor. Five Miles Away
is as important for its effort to change the tone of the conversation as for
its arguments about choice and accountability. It rejects discourse that
begins and ends with the structural racism and inequities of American
education as either the "shame of the nation" or as irrelevant to reality.
Ryan very craftily sets up Five Miles Away in opposition to Jonathan
Kozol and his widely read 1992 Savage Inequalities.47  Savage
Inequalities is in love with binaries, school districts that are geographi-
cally adjacent but might as well be in different universes. The grinding
poverty of the South Bronx or urban Detroit is paired with the unself-
conscious opulence of Great Neck and Grosse Pointe.' Kozol's tone
throughout is the despairing moralism of the jeremiad?9 Not so Ryan.
He deploys the same method-juxtaposing the stories of two close-by
Virginia high schools, Freeman High (relatively affluent and relatively
white) and Thomas Jefferson (neither of these) - but with opposite
rhetorical intentions. Ryan is explicit about this:
Freeman and Tee-Jay . . . are not the type of schools depicted in
Jonathan Kozol's well-known book Savage Inequalities, which
paints a shocking portrait of urban-suburban disparities that are cer-
tainly real in some places but far from the norm ....
46. Id. at 16,295.
47. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S ScHOOLs (1992).
48. Id. at 178, 202-04.
49. See id.; accord JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF
APARTHEID SCHOOUNG IN AMERICA (2005).
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Neither school is at the extreme end of the spectrum in terms of stu-
dent composition, funding, performance, or facilities. Freeman is
not a lily-white, gold-plated suburban school .... In turn, Tee-Jay
is predominantly black and poor but not exclusively so .... The
future is less bleak for Tee-Jay, and more uncertain for Freeman,
than one might believe from reading accounts that depict urban
schools as vermin-infested centers of misery and suburban schools
as Shangri-Las °
What they are, however, is unintegrated and unequal. Their very quo-
tidianness makes it even more troubling that they are "a world apart."
What to do then? For Ryan, the goal is to advance the ball and actual-
ly make progress, not to rail at injustice. He has therefore championed,
in a sequence of penetrating and sometimes prescient law review articles,
an approach that accepts the political reality of suburban power and then
inquires how one can within that reality, or, more aptly, at the margins of
that reality, craft reforms that might actually make the education of the
poor better, the education of everyone more diverse, and the educational
system more equitable. Ryan favors the term "nudge": the trick is to rec-
ognize the constraints that shape the system, like Nixon's compromise,
and then to deploy that understanding to nudge the system in a produc-
tive direction.' Doing so is not necessarily easy, and is far from a sure
thing, but it is possible, and it is the only productive approach.
Given this mindset, it is no surprise that Ryan pins his hopes on demo-
graphic change. He notes the growth of the overall nonwhite population,
increased racial diversity in the suburbs, and the "nascent" racial inte-
gration of inner cities as they become more attractive to middle-income
families." Growing numbers of whites living in cities and minorities
living in suburbs prefigure, perhaps, a reversal of the white flight that
Milliken seemed to have cemented. School districts must seize this
trend, attracting or retaining white, middle-income families for the pub-
lic schools. Such a goal can be advanced by arguments that diversity
benefits all students, but the middle-income will not be swayed unless
they are also given good schools. If their needs can be met, political
coalitions might emerge that could defeat Nixon's compromise.
50. RYAN, supra note 1, at 4.
51. Id. at 16,281.
52. Id. at 282-83.
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Racially mixed suburbs like Montclair, NJ and Montgomery County,
MD offer Ryan and his readers a model .3
This conclusion seems foreordained in light of Ryan's two conversa-
tion-changing moves. If we accept that education reform is governed by
Nixon's compromise--the protection of the prerogatives of relatively
wealthy, mostly white suburbanites-but are also determined to nudge
the system towards progress, the only viable approach seems to be one
in which relatively wealthy, mostly white suburbanites find their pre-
rogatives aligned with the poor, non-white students whose interests
Ryan and many of his colleagues in the education-law academy cham-
pion. Progress requires a convergence of interest between the haves and
have-nots.' Ryan identifies the changing demographics of the American
metropolis as the best hope for finding it.
III. IDEAS, CENTRALIZATION, AND CUSTOMIZATION
The ambitions and policy prescriptions of Paul Peterson's Saving
Schools differ remarkably from those of Five Miles Away, given that the
two volumes cover so much of the same terrain. The two do agree about
many things. They share a similar approach to Brown, acknowledging its
importance but treating it as "less of an end than a beginning"5 5 and focus-
ing upon the stubborn resistance of American education to the hopes
raised by the civil rights movement. Peterson offers an account of the
school finance lawsuits that demanded equality and adequacy quite simi-
lar to Ryan's. And both volumes emphasize school choice reforms and the
accountability movement epitomized by the No Child Left Behind Act.
Still, the contrasts are substantial. Ryan's concerns are squarely locat-
ed within today's mainstream law school narrative of education law,
framed by the heroic, but unrealized, vision of Brown and the contem-
porary reality of racially and economically stratified schools. Peterson,
by contrast, offers a version of the "conservative" counter narrative of
contemporary educational policy analysis, identifying educational medi-
53. Id. at 294-95.
54. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980) (introducing the interest-convergence thesis). Cf. Robert
A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REv. 599,610-11 (2011) (argu-
ing on the basis of interest convergence that white families should self-interestedly embrace
school integration).
55. PErERSON, supra note 1, at 53.
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ocrity as the core crisis of American education, and educational inequity
partly as a symptom and partly as a serious but secondary problem. 6
This perspective is pervasive, beginning with Peterson's engagingly per-
sonal introduction, which describes his own schooling "circa 1950" as
"a middling experience."57 He notes its racial homogeneity,58 but gives
equal attention to its attitudes towards religion 9 and greater emphasis to
its largely ho-hum academic offerings. 0 The same perspective leads
Peterson to identify the Reagan Administration's 1983 publication of its
Nation at Risk report as a "triggering event that mobilized national dis-
satisfaction"6' and to treat William Bennett, Reagan's flamboyant
Secretary of Education, as a pivotal personality. And it leads Peterson,
one of the most prominent academic advocates for school choice, to
devote most of his book's final part to choice-a part which he titles
"Signs of Resurrection."
That Peterson's volume differs from Ryan's in these ways is no sur-
prise. It is the less expected differences between the volumes that are
more important and commend Peterson's book to education lawyers.
One of these is particularly apparent. Ryan, the academic lawyer, cen-
ters his narrative on the political economy embodied in Nixon's com-
promise. Peterson, the political scientist whom one might have expect-
ed to focus upon iron laws, undertakes a history of ideas. "Ideas," writes
Peterson, "motivate great undertakings that change the political
world .62
That ideas move educational politics is Peterson's central and most
ambitious claim. It shapes the entire volume. It leads Peterson to begin
his narrative earlier than Ryan does, devoting a chapter to Horace Mann
and another to John Dewey and the Progressives, before arriving at
Brown v. Board. It also leads Peterson to organize the book around six
leading "heroic" personalities: Mann, Dewey, Martin Luther King Jr.,
union organizer Albert Shanker, Bennett, and educational sociologist
James S. Coleman.3
56. Peterson acknowledges the support of the Hoover Institution at the front of his volume.
Id. at vii.
57. Peterson nevertheless describes the American educational system of the late 1950s as
"the envy of the world." Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 12.
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Peterson's interest in Mann and Dewey are a welcome palliative to the
tendency in legal academia to work with the institutions we have with-
out recognizing the extent to which they are the result of particular legal
and political decisions that could have been made, and could still be
made, differently. Ryan affirms this point but Peterson gives it life.
Mann and the Progressives had very particular ideas about what public
schooling should be: free, democratic, and based on expertise. These
ideas have been extraordinarily successful, to the extent that they have
been systematically codified in state constitutions and state legislative
and regulatory codes.64 But even constitutionalized Progressivism is
susceptible to amendment and reinterpretation. Peterson's longer view
portrays a national conversation about education that is less static than
when seen through Ryan's lens. Further change seems more plaiusible,
even inevitable-even change more radical than a nudge. Peterson's
case for the possibility of real change is welcome in legal circles, where
we are accustomed to banging our heads against Nixon's compromise
and the apparent deadlock that has resulted.
But Peterson's approach is also a bracing challenge to lawyers.
Peterson elevates ideas as critical catalysts of change. But even as he
acknowledges the "new legalism in American education,"65 few of the
ideas in which Peterson is interested are lawyers.' Not one of the per-
sonalities around whom Peterson structures Saving Schools is an attor-
ney: they are teachers, academics, businesspeople, politicians, and
union organizers. Most jarring to the legal reader is Peterson's chapter,
"Martin Luther King Jr. and School Desegregation," which demotes
Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues from the throne to which lawyers
customarily assign them. Peterson intends no discredit to Marshall, but
sees the idea of racial equality, not the strategy for winning Brown in the
Supreme Court, as the pivotal move. "So it is the eloquent minister, not
the dogged attorney, whose birthdate is rightly honored as a national hol-
iday.' '
This necessarily catches the attention of us lawyers trained to lionize
Marshall, his honed strategy and careful briefs.67 Ideas and arguments
are the professional province of the lawyer; they are our stock in trade.
64. See Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States' Duly to Support "Public" Schools, 48
BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 909,925-27 (2007).
65. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 103.
66. Id. at 53.
67. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTmCE 518-25,618-19,635-45 (1975).
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We celebrate the legalism in American education because we imagine
that it is a fount of powerful ideas. Peterson, surveying the conceptual
landscape of American education, concludes otherwise. With respect to
the one set of lawyers' ideas that Peterson considers at length, those
about school finance equity, he is unimpressed. The idea of fiscal ade-
quacy, on which the school-finance movement has ultimately placed its
reliance, "has floundered in one state after another, in part because of its
own intrinsic lack of merit."'  The companion idea of fiscal equity,
which adequacy partially displaced when equity arguments failed con-
sistently to win in court, was a better, even a "powerful" idea, but not
one that could command consensus in American society." It "came up
against the basic fact that those with more money want to spend more on
their children's education, just as they want to spend more on housing,
transportation, and all the other good things in life.... Fiscal equity was
divisive."
Ryan shares Peterson's conclusion that courts have had little impact
since Brown on questions of equity."0 But Ryan sidelines legal argu-
mentation because it can offer no effective counterweight to suburban
political power. Peterson minimizes it because he does not think legal
thinking about education has sufficient intellectual heft. Peterson's
interest in ideas rather than argument also shapes his treatment of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),7 which offers an
important corrective to most lawyers' understanding of special educa-
tion. Legal academics tend to view the IDEA as an extension of Brown's
core idea of equality to the disabled. Dean Martha Minow's recent treat-
ment is paradigmatic.72 The disabled, like racial minorities, had been
denied equal access to schooling; the principle of equity required that
this be corrected. For the disabled, of course, the injury could not be
remedied merely by throwing open the schoolhouse doors, or by mere
integration; the disabled suffered from a lack of meaningful access, and
schools had to change to make that access genuine.73 From these princi-
ples emerge the particular animating doctrines of the IDEA: the indi-
68. PErERSON, supra note 1, at 149.
69. Id. at 142.
70. RYAN, supra note 1, at 300.
71. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2010).
72. See MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN'S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL
LANDMARK 71-72,80 (2010).
73. Id. at 69-70, 74-75.
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vidual right to a free, appropriate public education (FAPE),74 the parental
right to participate in the development of an individualized education
plan (IEP),7 the preference for mainstreaming,6 and the requirement
that disabled children be searched for and identified.'
Peterson, by contrast, sees in the IDEA a paradigm shift that makes it
"among the most consequential" of rights-granting moves in American
education. 8 "[Flor the first time, federal sanction was given to parents'
deeply held desire to provide their children with a customized education.
What had been theorized by Rousseau and championed by Dewey now
became federal law." The idea that individual students could be entitled
to "customization and attention to the wishes of the client"79- although
the entitlement is limited to the disabled-is a sea change in education-
al law on par with the idea of equity itself.
Peterson does not extend this argument as far as he might. The idea
that he places at the center of the IDEA-that public education should
be both appropriate and individualized-has had vital and underappre-
ciated consequences. A parent whose child has a legal right to an appro-
priate education, and who has the legal power to negotiate the details of
the educational program his children will receive, is much more like a
consumer than like a citizen. The citizen, even if he does not display the
passivity in the face of professional expertise idealized by the
Progressives, ° is limited in his ability to affect his child's education to
the options of exit and of political action. The requirement that a parent
consent to the IEP, in contrast, gives parents bargaining power to seek
the particularized good of their child and family. As in a market, pro-
ducer and consumer must come to a meeting of the minds.
The parents of typical children, no less than the parents of disabled,
appreciate the appeal of free, customized, individualized education.
They seek it routinely, but without a legal entitlement and therefore with
much less bargaining power. It is self-evident that not only the disabled
can benefit personally from customization and from parent advocacy
with teeth.
74. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), 1412(1).
75. Id. §§ 1401(18), 1415(b)(2).
76. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(2).
77. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1).
78. PErERSON, supra note 1, at 95.
79. Id. at 91.
80. Id. at 45-46,49-50.
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In this way, the IDEA helped jumpstart a shift in American parents'
self-perception vis-A-vis the school system, one that continues to trans-
form their attitudes from passive receivers of expert government servic-
es into consumers who ought to be given what they want. Parents who
enjoy IDEA rights behave like customers, not like citizens; other par-
ents, who are after all their neighbors, their friends, and themselves, nat-
urally begin to think and act like customers too. The rise of special edu-
cation thus helped lead to school choice, which invites all parents to use
a sort of marketplace, what the literature calls a "quasi-market,"8' as a
tool to customize and to bargain for their children's education-just as
they seek to customize and bargain for what they desire from the "other
good things in life."
Peterson is not naive about the power of ideas. He is as interested in
anyone in structural phenomena that constrain those ideas and delimit
their path. As noted above, Peterson argues that the idea of fiscal equi-
ty ran aground against the self-interest of the affluent, dovetailing with
Ryan's account of Nixon's compromise. Peterson makes more of a dif-
ferent structural problem, which he labels "the iron law of increasing
centralization-and cost."82 In no small part because of collective bar-
gaining by teachers, teacher pay rose dramatically in the twentieth cen-
tury. There was a parallel increase in the national ratio of educational
workers, and especially of non-instructional staff, to pupils.' But these
increases have not generated productivity gains. Peterson, reiterating
the argument of a 1966 study by William J. Baumol & William G.
Bowen of the performing arts industry,. concludes that "[a]s a labor-
intensive industry, education is doomed to a treadmill of rising costs and
declining adequacy" because it is not in a position to increase produc-
tivity per worker. 5 He quotes Baumol and Bowen: "Education, like the
arts, affords little opportunity for systematic and cumulative increases in
productivity. The most direct way to increase output per hour of teach-
ing-an increase in the size of classes-usually results directly in a dete-
81. E.g., James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging
Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 839;
Christopher Lubienski, School Choice and Privatization in Education, 4 J. CRITICAL EDUC. POCY
STUDS. 1,4-5 (2006).
82. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 149.
83. Id. at 133-34.
84. Id. at 150-51 & 297 n.23 (citing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORM-
ING ARTS: THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA (1966)).
85. Id. at 150.
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rioration of the product, which is unacceptable to much of the commu-
nity."86 The only path to quality gains, therefore, is for taxpayers to
"spend an ever-higher percentage of their income on public education.""
Taxpayers are no longer, if they ever were, willing to do this.?
This argument generates one of the most surprising aspects of Saving
Schools, its unexpectedly lukewarm endorsement of school choice.
Although Peterson offers an account of research on the effectiveness of
choice considerably more enthusiastic than Ryan's-along with an enter-
tainingly personal account of his role in some that -research'-he sees
no panacea. "The school voucher idea changed the conversation about
schools," but its time has not yet come.9 Although Peterson accepts
research showing academic gains as a result of vouchers, he admits the
results are less than spectacular.9' Peterson also accepts the standard view
that "the voucher movement stalled somewhere in the first decade of the
twentieth century," beset by opposition from unions, state courts, voters,
and legislators. 2
Peterson makes much the same argument about charter schools.
These have been able to gain public and political acceptance.' But still,
he thinks that charters "could turn out to be little other than a boutique
within the public school shopping mall."'94 They are limited by states'
internal rules and more importantly by their variable quality.95 And the
"charter presence is substantial in only a few parts of the country:
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Albany, New York, and some cities in
Ohio" 96-to which list should be added New Orleans. 7
Still, Peterson gives choice credit "[iln the world of ideas."98 There,
"something transformative has already happened.... [E]ducation is now
being thought of as something that must be customized to the needs and
86. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 151-52 & 297 n.23 (citing Baumol & Bowen, supra note 84,
at 171).
87. Id. at 153.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 196-200.
90. Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 208-09.
92. Id. at 207.
93. Id. at 212-17.
94. Id. at 218.
95. Id. at 218-19.
96. Id. at 220.
97. See Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District
Act and New Orleans' Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REv. 125, 125 (2007).
98. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 227.
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wants of families and individuals. That families should have a choice of
schools is no longer just the ideology of an isolated fringe; it is now
broadly accepted as a legitimate claim."' Any new conversation about
education must accept this transformation of American parents from cit-
izens into quasi-consumers.
IV. PHYSICAL SPACE AND CYBERSPACE
The centrality of Nixon's compromise to Ryan's analysis leads him to
pin his hopes upon shifts in the demography of race and wealth. If the
educational interests of relatively rich, relatively white suburbanites
consistently prevail, then equity will increase to the extent that prosper-
ous whites live and attend school in the same places as everyone else.
Peterson's central structural observation -that it is ever more difficult to
increase productivity per worker in an industry as labor-intensive as edu-
cation-leads him just as logically to identify electronic education as the
next transformative educational idea.'" In this Part, I suggest virtual
education also has vital implications for Ryan's arguments about the
structure of physical space.
The virtual education idea is simple in theory. If students consume
"predeveloped" computerized curricula, and interact with teachers elec-
tronically and asynchronously, educators might teach many more stu-
dents, and some of the more glaring inefficiencies of place-based
brick-and-mortar schooling, such as small specialized classes, could be
ameliorated 10 Moreover, virtual classrooms could accelerate pedagog-
ical "customization," so that many more students could "have educa-
tional experiences designed for their specific needs."'' 2 Virtual educa-
tion offered asynchronously is "accessible regardless of space and
99. Id.
100. Id. at 231-34.
101. See, e.g., Susan Essoyan, Hybrid Hawaii Tech. School Sees Rapid Enrollment Growth:
'One Size Fits One'at Hawaii Tech Academy, EDUC. WK., June 8, 2011 (reporting that hybrid
charter can grow rapidly despite limited physical plant because most students work from home
and come to school only occasionally).
102. PErERSON, supra note 1, at 253.
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time,"'" making courses at the right level, specialized instruction, and
arcane curricula potentially available to every student."
Peterson is no utopian. He admits that so far cyberschools have been
"hardly transformative."'' 5 His case study of the Florida Virtual School
(FLVS) notes this throughout. He reports, for example, that two of
FLVS's most popular courses are "Life Management Skills" and
"Health/Physical Education"' 6-a remarkable fact I have not seen in
other accounts of FLVS. °7 He also notes that FLVS courses "are taken
disproportionately by students in the nonpublic sector,"''08 and that FLVS
in its current incarnation has the same employee-student ratio as tradi-
tional schools. But Peterson is not exaggerating virtual education's
potential. Multiple observers suggest that "the education system of the
United States stands at the precipice of an online learning revolution,""
103. Id. at 254. See also Kathleen Ellis, Cyber Charter Schools: Evolution, Issues, and
Opportunities in Funding and Localized Oversight, 86 EDUC. HORIZONS 142, 144 (2008).
Education scholars sometimes refer to this as the "out-of-school model." See J. SCHNITZ, & J.E.
YOUNG, MODELS OF VIRTUAL SCHOOLING (2002) (available at http://www.can.ibm.com/k 12/pdf/
VirtualSchool.pdf).
104. Accord FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN 20, 136,245 (hereinafter FCC PLAN) ("Broadband-enabled online learning has
the power to provide high-quality educational opportunities to these students-opportunities to
which their peers at the best public and private schools have long had access."); Tom Clark &
Zane L. Berge, Perspectives on Virtual Schools, in VIRTUAL SCHOOLS: PLANNING FOR SUCCESS 9,
11-13 (Zane L. Berge & Tom Clark eds. 2005).
105. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 251.
106. Id. at 244.
107. See Thomas Clark, Virtual Schooling and Basic Education, in ECONOMICS OF DISTANCE
AND ONLINE LEARNING: THEORY, PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 52,55 (William J. Bramble & Santosh
Panda eds. 2008); Bruce Friend & Sharon Johnston, Florida Virtual School: A Choice for all
Students, in VIRTUAL SCHOOLS: PLANNING FOR SUCCESS, supra note 104, at 97-113.
108. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 260.
109. Kevin P. Brady, Regina R. Umpstead, & Suzanne E. Eckes, Unchartered Territory:
The Current Legal Landscape of Public Cyber Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 191,
192 (2010) (citing CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, MICHAEL B. HORN & CURTIS W. JOHNSON,
DISRUPTING CLASS: How DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION WILL CHANGE THE WAY THE WORLD LEARNS
103 (2008)). See also Kerry Lynn Rice, A Comprehensive Look at Distance Education in the
K-12 Context, 38 J. RESEARCH ON TECH. IN EDUC. 425, 426-28 (2006); Jay Greene et al.,
Expanding Choice in Elementary and Secondary Education: A Report on Rethinking the Federal
Role in Education (Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings), Feb. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0202 schoolchoice.aspx) (advocating expanded cyber-
learning); Constance Gustke, Virtual Ed. Biz. Seeks Mainstream, EDUC. WK., July 14,2010 ("for-
profit providers of online courses ... are breaking into the public education mainstream"); David
W. Chen & Michael M. Grynbaum, 'Pilot' Label Lets Mayor's Projects Skip City Review, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2011 (reporting that New York City plans a $100 million pilot online learning
initiative); Azam Ahmed, Chicago Schools Place Virtual Ed. Initiatives High on Priority List,
EDUC. WK.,Sept. 22,2010 (the "Chicago [school] district now offers a battery of online programs,
ranging from math and reading enrichment, in which elementary students spend a few hours a
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and the idea of virtual school has transformative possibilities. It simul-
taneously could increase both the economic efficiency and pedagogical
quality of schooling.
Virtual schooling as an idea also has enormous potential to address
Ryan's five miles away problem. The rich have effected Nixon's com-
promise through a geographical strategy: they have walled themselves
off in their own jurisdictions, where they can govern their own educa-
tional systems using the institutions of local control and local taxation,
and where Milliken and Milliken-esque policies at all levels of govern-
ment protect them from cross-border incursions. Wealthy and middle-
class school districts use zoning, taxes, and other devices to exclude the
poor."' In this way the legal institution of the geographic school district
boundary is the primary means by which inequality is maintained.
District boundaries are also the primary way that inequality is justified:
the principle of local control of education is deeply rooted and attractive
in American discourse."' So long as schooling requires students to
gather in a physical location, schools have to be local. Localism also
reflects the attractive idea that neighbors unite to educate their own chil-
dren together, in their own fashion and in tune with their own prefer-
ences.' Such justifications of localism resonate across the culture and
have been proffered by actors from the Supreme Court to ordinary citi-
zens."3 But these justifications resonate much less in the face of an edu-
cational approach growing in popularity that is completely personaliz-
able, atomistic, and without any necessary connection to any particular
facility or community. Although localism justifies inequality, inequali-
ty does not justify localism.
If virtual schools render physical space irrelevant, the most important
legal and political tools the rich have developed to isolate themselves
from the education of the rest of the population are made irrelevant also.
Peterson cautions that the rich may be the first beneficiaries of cybered-
week online using a specific curriculum, to a virtual charter school with students learning almost
entirely from home. The latest initiative, announced last month, is a pilot program to add 90 min-
utes to the day at 15 elementary schools using online courses in place of certified teachers.");
Associated Press, Wis. Mulls Scrapping State Enrollment Cap for Its Virtual Schools, EDUC. WK.,
Feb. 24, 2010, at 10.
110. See Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government without T7ebout, 41 URB. L. 93, 107 &
nn.67-71 (2009).
111. See Saiger, School District Boundary Problem, supra note 12, at 518-27.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 518 & nn.70-71.
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ucation, as they have been of other technological innovations.1 '4 Today's
unequal distribution of broadband access suggests that virtual schooling
could carry with it some fairly entrenched inequities;" 5 on the other
hand, distributional differences are dominated by an urban/rural divide,
which correlates far from perfectly with racial and economic cleavages,
and which also is affected by fairly idiosyncratic factors." 6
Nevertheless, Peterson is correct to insist that the cyberschooling idea,
and its realization in the longer term, is equalizing:
[E]ven if outcomes become more unequal in the short run, as always
happens when innovations are introduced, the opportunity to learn
will be equalized. Access to quality courses will not depend on the
price of the house you buy or the quality of the peers in your imme-
diate neighborhood. Any student with a will to learn will have
access to the best."
17
In such a system physical proximity is unnecessary and our particular
legal institutions that assume its necessity become unjustifiable.
Cyberschools, in short, seem to have more to offer James Ryan than the
gradual, spotty, and uncertain process of integration in cities and close-
in suburbs in real space.
Indeed, cyberschooling even has potential to help remedy the interstate
educational inequities to which nearly all policymakers had resigned
themselves." 8 Peterson makes brief mention of FLVS's success in mar-
keting itself outside the state through a "Global Services Division."" 9
The potential of cyberschooling should lead both Ryan and Peterson
to reassess their conviction that the charter school movement does not
have the potential to remake educational law and practice. Chartering is
likely to be the principal modality by which cyberschools penetrate the
market. Although FLVS is not a charter school, 2° most cyberschools are
114. PErERSON, supra note 1, at 260-61. See also Tony H. Grubesic, A Spatial Taxonomy of
Broadband Regions in the United States, 18 INFO. EcON. & POL'Y 18 423, 424 (2006) (citing
arguments that high-speed internet will diffuse similarly to other communications technologies).
115. See FCC PLAN, supra note 104, at 19 (noting large numbers of Americans without
broadband access, including "[mlore than 10 million school-age children").
116. See id. at 136; Grubesic, supra note 114, at 428.
117. PETERSON,supra note 1, at 262.
118. But see Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2044 (2006) (presenting data on these inequities and arguing that Congress is obligated
under the Fourteenth Amendment to correct them).
119. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 246.
120. Friend & Johnston, supra note 107, at 98.
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charters 2 and one in fifty charter school students is enrolled in a virtu-
al school. '22 Sixteen states permit virtual schools to charter.'23
Approximately 86 virtual charter schools served over 31,000 students
nationwide during the 2003-04 school year.' 24
Cybercharters are susceptible afortiori, and especially as now imple-
mented, to many of the criticisms leveled at charters more generally
regarding spotty quality, low standards, inequitable access, and unfair-
ness to traditional public schools .125 But they also have the potential to
create the kind of interest convergence that Five Miles Away advocates,
while avoiding the bruising political battles that Ryan otherwise correct-
ly anticipates. The laws authorizing cybercharters have not been partic-
ularly controversial. And they have generated constituencies outside of
underserved groups. Importantly, they have been taken up enthusiasti-
cally by homeschoolers, albeit with some opposition from purists in the
homeschooling movement.' 26 Traditionally, home schooling rights are
protected but homeschoolers, like private schools, must meet state
requirements at their own expense.' 27 By enrolling students in a cyber-
charter, parents can get access to professionally developed materials and
professional teaching but still keep children home and retain control
over the materials children see and how those materials are used.
More recently, virtual chartering has generated interest from religious
schools. The right to enroll in religious schools is guaranteed,'2 ' but those
121. See JOHN WATSON, BUSH GEMIN, & JENNIFER RYAN, KEEPING PACE WiTH K-12 ONLINE
LEARNING: A REVIEW OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY AND PRACTICE 8 (2008). There exists a only hand-
ful of non-charter, district-run virtual programs. See id. Cf. Pa. Virtual Schools Struggle to Meet
State Standards, EDUC. WK., Sept. 1, 2010 ("Illn Pennsylvania .... the cyber charter school
experiment has morphed into a movement, serving ... more than 23,000 full-time students.").
122. See Brady et al., supra note 109, at 196. This data is inconsistently gathered and report-
ed. For example, it is reported that homeschoolers make up a significant fraction of total charter
enrollments, and many of these presumably do their schoolwork online. P. Lines, When
Homeschoolers Go To School: A Partnership Between Families and Schools, 75 PEABODY J.
EDUC. 159 (2000).
123. See Clark, supra note 107, at 57.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2011, at I (surveying complaints about online charters); Pat Kossan, Anne Ryman, &
Matt Dempsey, Online Schools Face Questions over Quality, Effectiveness, ARIZ. REPUB., Dec.
11,2011.
126. See Clark, supra note 107, at 57-58.
127. See Michael W. Apple, Are We Wasting Money on Computers in Schools?, 18 EDUC.
POL'Y 513, 516-18 (2004); Bruce S. Cooper & John Sureau, The Politics of Homeschooling:
-New Developments, New Challenges, 21 EDUC. POL'Y 110, 115, 125 (2007).
128. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
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schools must pay to duplicate the state-required secular instructional pro-
gram in addition to providing religious education. However, if individ-
ual families can choose to enroll their children in asynchronous private
schools, and students so enrolled can do their computer-based secular les-
sons wherever and whenever they wish, presumably they can choose to
do them while inside of a religious establishment. Variations of this
model are in place in various religious schools around the country.'2 9
Consider some exemplary, stylized arrangements. Take an existing
religious private school, and enroll all of its students in a remote, asyn-
chronous charter school. These students, now at state expense, can
engage in secular studies while sitting in the religious school class-
room.'3 ° The religious teacher might work with half the class on some
religious topic while the other half, on its own for the moment, engages
in secular cyber-study under the teacher's passive supervision. Or a
cleric might begin a 45-minute English lesson with a prayer-right before
secular studies begin - or interrupt a cyber-biology lesson to admonish
students that "[tihis evolution bit is straight from Satan."'3 Although
actual adult supervision is still often necessary, especially for younger
children, many of the secular educational services that the religious
school classically had to provide at its own expense are now provided by
the state; tuition can go down (or school salaries and profits can rise)
accordingly.'32
Indeed, adult supervision is the source of potentially large cost sav-
ings. One of the unattractive features of virtual schooling from parents'
point of view is that it requires, especially for younger children but for
some older ones as well, an adult to be on-site with the child to assist and
129. See J.C. Reindl, Knight Academy Charter School Scheduled to Open in West Toledo,
TOLEDO BLADE, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.toledoblade.com/Education/2008/07/1 1/
Knight-Academy-charter-school-scheduled-to-open-in-West-Toledo.html (affiliation of a new
charter with existing Catholic school); Julie Wiener, Has Tech Reached the Tipping Point, (N.Y.)
JEWISH WK., July 26,2011 (Orthodox Jewish yeshiva in Los Angeles that teaches religious stud-
ies using traditional face-to-face instruction from the first bell until 2 p.m., whereupon all stu-
dents pursue secular studies as cybercharter students under the physical supervision of the reli-
gious teaching staff).
130. See Wiener, supra note 129.
131. Guy Lancaster, "This Evolution Bit is Straight from Satan": McLean v. Arkansas
Board of Education and the Democratization of Southern Christianity, 33 RELIGION & EDUC. 69,
84 (2006) (quoting a participant in debates in the 1980s over teaching creationism in Arkansas).
Of course, non-apocalyptic versions of the creationist countemarrative are also available and
could be presented to students. Cf. Apple, supra note 127, at 518 (noting the admixture of secu-
lar and religious content in the context of home schooling).
132. "Almost" because, especially with younger children, some cyber-charter lessons
require an on-site adult to actively teach the material; cyber-charters do not pay these "teachers."
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supervise.'33 This person is not remunerated by the cybercharter's state
funding.' The combination of private and asynchronous charter educa-
tion therefore might cost parents less than asynchronous education
alone.35
It is hard to see how such arrangements, or a multiplicity of similar
ones, could run afoul of any statutory or constitutional principle, particu-
larly if the religious school picks a secular cyber-provider off the shelf
rather than itself becoming or developing a virtual program.'36 The whole
idea of the remote charter is that a child can do her secular studying any-
where and anytime. Cyber-students are allowed to make their own sched-
ules and allow for interruptions. The technology of remote instruction,
in effect, allows for the supplementation of religious education with state-
funded secular instruction in a way simultaneously far more pervasive
and far less entangling than ever contemplated in the Aguilar/Agostini
line of cases' 7 in which publicly funded teachers were sent to teach secu-
lar subjects in religious schools. More pervasive-because the stream of
secular instruction can be turned on and off throughout the day, at the dis-
cretion of religious instructors, rather than delivered at an isolated, partic-
ularized hour by an employee who comes to the school to deliver it. Less
entangling-because there is no state employee on site; secular instruc-
tion arrives disembodied, over the internet, and in the identical form that
other children, uninvolved in religious education, receive it. Secular edu-
cation is provided in exactly the same way for students on isolated hill-
tops in Idaho as it is for kids performing on Broadway in New York City,
who are cyber-students for reasons that have nothing to do with religion.
These sorts of arrangements simultaneously avoid endorsement concerns
that public employees working in religious institutions might come to
engage in religious instruction'38 and the entanglement problems that
133. See Ellis, supra note 103, at 144; Edward Lin, Comment, Virtual Schools: Real
Discrimination, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 177, 186 (2008).
134. See id.
135. Cf. Michelle R. Davis, Hybrid Charters on the Move, EDUC. WK., June 15, 2011
(describing "hybrid charter schools" as those which combine online and face-to-face instruction
and noting that "the need for many parents to have their children supervised during the workday
... is a driving force behind some hybrid charter schools, even if it's not an academic one").
136. Concerned about the latter possibility, some states prohibit it. E.g., 24 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1745-A(b) ("No cyber charter school shall be established or funded by and no charter shall
be granted to a sectarian school, institution or other entity."). Cf. N.Y. Charter Schools Act of
1998 §2852(3) ("An existing private school shall not be eligible to convert to a charter school.").
137. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985)).
138. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 386 (1985).
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could arise from efforts to supervise or regulate such instructors in ways
that would prevent them from doing so. '
Nor, in my view, would Locke v. Davey,'" which permitted states to
exclude religious schools from otherwise general voucher programs sup-
ported with state funds, extend to permit states to allow students to inter-
rupt their cyber-studies at any time for any reason except for religion.
Davey rested heavily on the fact that the scholarships in question would
have been used by students for "an essentially religious endeavor," "a
religious calling as well as an academic pursuit."'4 ' Cybercharter pro-
grams are a secular endeavor and provide only secular materials and
instruction at state expense.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of a religious school principal, a
tuition-paying parent, or a pedagogical expert, much secular education
under this model could be delivered nearly as it traditionally has been in
pervasively sectarian religious schools-except that now the state is pay-
ing. I conclude that cyberchartering, whatever its other virtues and
vices, is a tool that could help achieve many of the interest-convergence
benefits Ryan seeks to attain through programs of intradistrict vouch-
ers.42 Families enrolled in religious schools would be powerful allies for
pro-equity forces. At the same time, this brief snapshot of the interac-
tion of virtual education, the charter school laws, and religion suggests
ways in which Ryan's proposal that interest convergence should be
sought by including private school parents in a pro-equity coalition
could have surprising consequences. If Peterson's analysis offers one
lesson, it is that big pedagogical ideas are hard to control and their
effects are hard to predict. The case of religious schools utilizing the
cybercharter form is a case in point. Although neither chartering nor vir-
tual education was developed with the needs or desires of religious edu-
cators in mind, such educators may be among their earliest and most
enthusiastic adopters. The result will be a certain kind of interest con-
vergence-but also a radical change in the relationship between secular
and religious, and public and private, education in America.
Cyberchartering is also likely to work similar disruption in other areas
of the law and of educational practice, not all of which can be predicted.
139. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409.
140. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
141. Id. at 721.
142. RYAN, supra note 1, at 289.
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It will change the jurisprudence on free speech rights of students, where
the cases imagine a bricks-and-mortar institution that must maintain
order and discipline while simultaneously modeling a democratic com-
munity that respects individual rights." The law and practice of special
education will change when it is no longer the case that the disabled
have a special entitlement to customized education and a preference for
being mainstreamed into traditional, place-based institutions.'"
Indeed, the very questions we ask about educational equity will
change. Cyberchartering offers a genuinely plausible strategy for dis-
placing geographic place as the basis for allocating educational goods
and their associated tax burdens. It is plausible because it relies not on
courts, not on legislatures, not even on politics itself, all of which are
institutions still in thrall to Nixon's compromise. Instead it relies on
individual consumers, seeking their own children's best interests in a
quasi-market. By establishing communities of interest that transcend
racial and class cleavages, it could significantly ameliorate educational
stratification that has been the bane of equity-minded policymakers for
generations. But the ability to customize education on a statewide, or
even national or global basis, will also surely create new kinds of strat-
ification-certainly by religion and surely by other categories as well.
These new patterns will bring different and dislocating problems of their
own. The broad problem of educational equity will be with us for a long
time. But there is every reason to think that virtual education will be the
biggest conversation-changer since John Dewey.
143. Cf. Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student
Speech in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611,643 (2010) (struggles over the reach of school
authority over student speech intensify "in the digital age" even when dealing with students who
are enrolled in ordinary, brick-and-mortar schools and merely doing their extracurricular speak-
ing on the internet).
144. Cf. Lin, supra note 133, at 187-88 (arguing that cyberschools discriminate against the
disabled by "requiring parents" to teach or provide services); Katie Ash, Going Virtual in Special
Ed., EDUC. WK., June 16, 2011 (discussing potential of virtual provision of special education
services).
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